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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and during the recovery phase afterwards, 
central banks globally have undertaken both conventional and unconventional measures to 
stabilize the economy and bolster growth. Since late 2008 and early 2009, the Federal Reserve 
(the Fed hereafter) and the Bank of England (the Bank hereafter), having already hit the zero 
lower bound, have embarked on large-scale purchases of long-term assets, commonly referred 
to as Quantitative Easing (QE hereafter), in order to provide monetary stimulus. The European 
Central Bank (ECB hereafter) followed by adopting an explicit QE program in January 2015. 
By the end of 2016, central bank assets in the US and the UK amounted to almost 24% of their 
respective gross domestic products (GDPs hereafter), while that of the ECB was almost 34% 
of Euro area’s GDP. Large-scale asset purchases during this period have been the main policy 
tool for major central banks globally, and the identification of their effectiveness has been a 
highly debatable topic for policymakers and practitioners alike. 
This paper examines the impact of Bank’s QE on both stock market returns and their 
volatility in the UK. We consider the effects of the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee 
(hereafter, the MPC) announcements on financial markets, focusing on the implications of the 
MPC's communication framework. In particular, we examine the impact of the Bank’s 
announcements on both stock market returns and volatility with special reference to the way in 
which the publication of inflation reports and MPC members’ voting patterns intertwine with 
the MPC meeting schedule and policy decisions. Our sample period begins with the onset of 
QE in the UK in 2009 and ends in 2017, during which time the Bank’s base policy rate was for 
most part stable and constrained by the effective zero lower bound. During this period, the 
Bank implemented monetary policy by purchasing UK government bonds worth a total of £435 
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billion.1 To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider the implications of the Bank’s 
asset purchase program for stock market volatility. Moreover, it is the first attempt to analyze 
the role of information releases (inflation reports and voting records) by the Bank in the context 
of QE policies.  
The impact of central bank asset purchases on equity prices potentially runs through 
three key theoretical channels of transmission (see e.g., Joyce et al. 2011 and Neely, 2015). 
Particularly, central bank announcements of asset purchases can increase equity prices through 
the portfolio balance channel by causing investors to rebalance their portfolios to include more 
equities, to the extent that the latter are better substitutes for bonds than money. An additional 
channel of transmission which leads to similar effects on equities is the liquidity channel, which 
posits that large-scale asset purchases can reduce liquidity premia in the markets, increasing, 
in turn, equity prices. The third key channel of transmission operates through the signaling 
effects of asset purchases on investors’ expectations. According to this channel, the ultimate 
impact of MPC announcements hinges on the way information from the announcements 
influence investors’ expectations regarding the future economic conditions and the path of 
interest rates. Against this background, worse- or better-than-expected news will exert different 
impact on equity prices pushing them at lower or higher levels respectively. 
The Bank’s asset purchases, if successfully implemented, are expected to lower long-
term rates and improve the outlook for economic activity and, thus, feed through to higher 
equity prices. Better informed expectations about the Bank’s future monetary policy stance are, 
therefore, important for the effectiveness of the Bank’s QE programme. To that end, we 
examine the implications of Bank’s communication, which holds a central role in managing 
investors’ expectations, for the impact of QE announcements on equities. Indicative of the 
                                                           
1 The Bank undertakes the purchases of gilts and (to a much lesser extent) corporate bonds via its subsidiary, the 
Asset Purchase Facility.    
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Bank’s increased interest in shaping investors’ expectations is also the adoption, since August 
2013, of another unconventional measure of monetary policy, the forward guidance. This 
measure allows the market participants to have a more informed view on the MPC’s reaction 
function, and it has already been implemented by the Fed post-crisis for the same reason since 
December 2008. 
We gauge the financial market reactions to the Bank’s MPC communication framework 
by analyzing how the proximity of the MPC announcement to the release of an inflation report 
and the pattern (unanimous versus dissenting votes) of the MPC members’ voting records may 
affect the equity responses to the announcements. During the period from 2009 to July 2015, 
the Bank’s MPC met every month to decide on its monetary policy. Between these MPC 
meetings, the Bank published the inflation report (when applicable) and the minutes from the 
previous meeting, which may have influenced the relative importance of MPC meetings 
announcements (Chortareas and Noikokyris, 2014). As inflation reports are released quarterly, 
there were three MPC announcements in between every two inflation report releases. The third 
occurred less than a week before the release of the inflation report. The minutes of the MPC 
meetings, which include the voting records of the MPC members, were published 
approximately two weeks after the meetings (and two weeks before the next meeting).  
-Figure 1 here- 
To illustrate this information dissemination structure, we provide Fig. 1, depicting the 
publication schedule of MPC meetings, their supporting minutes, and inflation reports over a 
three-month period from November 2009 to February 2010. It is important to note that the 
timeline of Bank’s information dissemination activities was rather regular, and the publication 
schedule during this three-month period is typical of the entire 2009-2015 period.  
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A voluminous literature on the relationship between QE policies and asset prices has 
evolved since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis and the adoption of QE policies by 
many central banks around the globe. The bulk of the evidence comes from the US, and the 
effects of QE implemented by the Federal Reserve are typically estimated in an event-study 
context by capturing the cumulative change in the price of a financial asset over a short window 
bracketing QE-related announcements. The results from the existing evidence point to lower 
longer-term rates following QE announcements (see e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011; D’Amico and 
King, 2013; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Meaning and Zhu, 2011; Neely, 
2015; Swanson, 2011). Further evidence is also derived from studies that examine the impact 
of the Fed’s QE programs on a wider array of financial assets. For instance, Neely (2015) finds 
that the Fed’s QE announcements lower global long-term interest rates as well as the price of 
the dollar, whereas Meaning and Zhu (2011) find that large-scale asset purchases by the Fed 
bolster equity prices and lower the market’s implied volatility (IV hereafter). 
Much of the extant literature on the effects of Bank’s asset purchases also uses the 
event-study framework and documents significant reductions in government gilt yields in the 
wake of QE announcements (e.g., Joyce et al., 2011; Breedon et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2012; 
Joyce and Tong, 2012). The evidence from the Bank’s first QE program, however, is 
inconclusive in terms of the equity market’s responses to QE announcements. Breedon et al. 
(2012) find that the Bank’s bond purchase operations over the 2009-2010 period did not result 
in significant responses in the equity market. Joyce et al. (2011) consider the same period and 
show that equities exhibited small and positive responses that are not uniform across the 6 QE 
announcements in their sample. In contrast to Breedon et al. (2012), however, Joyce et al. 
(2011) consider the days that asset purchases were announced as opposed to the days of actual 
purchases. 
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The empirical framework in this paper captures the association of intraday equity 
returns with the news component of the QE announcement. Following academic convention, 
we derive the news component of the monetary policy announcement using economists’ survey 
data (Cahill et al., 2013; Joyce et al., 2011; McLaren et al., 2014). Existing evidence on equity 
reactions to QE news from MPC meetings indicates a weak, if any, relationship. Using data 
until 2014, Rogers et al. (2014), conduct a multi-country study, finding that UK equities exhibit 
a positive reaction to Bank’s expansionary market-based QE policy shocks in the first 15 
minutes of the announcements. This reaction, however, is smaller than that reported for the US 
and the Eurozone. Rosa (2012), who derives QE policy shocks from Financial Times articles, 
finds that until June 2011, equity returns are not associated with QE news in the first 25 minutes 
following the MPC decision announcement. Both studies rely exclusively on short intraday 
windows to gauge the reaction of the equity markets, and they do not examine whether the 
Bank’s communication framework influences the magnitude of the pass-through of QE news 
into UK equities. 
The relationship between monetary policy and stock market volatility has also seen 
some attention in the literature (Lobo, 2000; Bomfim, 2003; Konrad, 2009). Identifying this 
relationship can reveal the impact of QE on the level of market participants’ uncertainty, 
allowing a more involved assessment of the way QE is transmitted to the real economy. 
Gospodinov and Jamali (2012) produce related evidence using daily data in event time and find 
that both the historical and implied volatility of US equity returns respond significantly to the 
Fed’s monetary policy shocks. In studies for the US and the Euro area, monetary policy shocks 
also emerge as a significant determinant of other financial asset’s intraday realized volatility, 
including exchange rates and bond yields (Andersson, 2010; Chuliá et al., 2010). Jubinski and 
Tomljanovich (2013) also find that US equities’ realized volatility is sensitive to the publication 
of the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC hereafter) meetings. 
  
6 
Surprisingly, however, there is no study, to our knowledge, considering the implications of QE 
for stock market volatility in the UK, while scant evidence exists for the US during the recent 
period of unconventional monetary policy.  
In this paper, we use an event-study framework, seeking to identify equities’ response 
to QE news over a narrow and a wider intraday window. We assert that an evaluation of the 
differences in equities’ reaction to MPC announcements over these two time-frames can reveal 
equity investors’ capacity to incorporate the economic news from MPC meetings. The notion 
of a narrow event window has the appealing property that the reaction estimates are not 
contaminated by other news arriving on the same day and influencing equity prices. Measuring 
the reaction of an asset in narrow event windows, however, might yield erroneous estimates 
capturing over- or underreactions. Embedded in this assumption is the acknowledgement that 
the initial reaction might fail to incorporate any subsequent upward or downward adjustments 
in the price of the asset (Thornton, 2014; Foerster and Cao, 2013). The case for possible over- 
or underreactions is reinforced by the complexity that the relatively novel policy of large-scale 
asset purchases presents for investors, that might require some additional time to fully price 
QE news, as well as by the sample period which is characterized by high turbulence and 
disruptions in the financial markets (Gagnon et. al., 2011; Joyce et. al., 2011; Meaning and 
Zhu, 2011; Neely, 2015).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II considers the effects of 
QE surprises on equity returns, as well as the implications of the MPC communication 
framework for their transmission. Section III shifts focus to the response of stock market 
returns’ implied and realized volatility to the MPC’s QE announcements and information 
dissemination by the Bank. Finally, Section IV concludes.   
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II. THE BANK’S ASSET PURCHASE NEWS AND EQUITY RETURNS 
 
A. The Benchmark Event-Study Empirical Setup. 
We measure the effects of the Bank’s MPC meeting announcements on UK equity 
returns during the period of QE spanning from 2009 to 2017 using an event-study framework. 
This framework allows capturing equities’ reaction to the unexpected elements of the Bank’s 
announcements over a short window bracketing the announcement. We begin by developing 
descriptive statistics to examine the equities’ market behavior on announcement days. Fig. 2 
shows the mean cumulative 5-minute returns on the FTSE-100 index from the market open of 
the MPC announcement day to the market close of the same day. We consider mean returns 
from 95 MPC announcement days that take place during the period under examination.  
- Figure 2 here - 
The 5-minute average cumulative stock returns indicate an upward trend in stock prices 
on the Thursdays of MPC announcement days, particularly in the hours following the 
announcement. Nevertheless, by the end of announcement days, stock prices drop to their level 
before the announcement. Most point-wise means of cumulative returns are not statistically 
different from zero, while most of the statistically significant results (at the 10% level of 
significance) can be seen in the hour following the announcement. In sharp contrast, the 
cumulative mean returns on all other Thursdays, which do not coincide with MPC 
announcement days, show – on average – slightly negative equity returns.2 The increase in 
equity prices during the hours leading up to the MPC announcement, however, points to the 
                                                           
2 The only two MPC meeting announcements that did not take place on a Thursday occurred on Monday 10th of 
May 2010 and Monday 11th of May 2015 due to the general elections.  
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possibility of a pre-announcement drift similar to that reported in the US equity market by 
Lucca and Moench (2015) for the Fed’s policy announcements. Moreover, the significant 
variability in stock prices during the hours following the announcement motivates the use of a 
wider window to evaluate the announcement’s effect. 
The Bank’s announcements are to some extent anticipated by the market, as they have 
been subject to intense scrutiny, both during the period of conventional monetary policy, and 
during the recent years when unconventional monetary policies have been pursued. 
Disentangling the stock market’s reaction to MPC announcements requires identification of the 
unexpected element of the announcements because equity markets do not react to anticipated 
pieces of information. The unexpected element of MPC announcements (i.e., the surprises, 
denoted as “S”) can be found in the difference between the actual amount of asset purchases 
announced by the Bank (A) and that expected by the market before the announcement (E). The 
market’s expectations regarding asset purchases are taken to be the average of the forecasts by 
economists appearing in Bloomberg’s survey. This survey has also been used by Melvin et al. 
(2010) to infer market expectations regarding the Bank’s monetary policy decisions before QE.  
- Figure 3 here - 
Fig. 3 shows the Bank’s unexpected asset purchases on MPC announcement days. 
Although economists’ forecasts are cast during the week before the MPC meeting, Bloomberg 
economists’ forecasts match the Bank’s announcements 73 out of 95 times. For most of the 
remaining announcements, the divergence was less than £10 billion, and all surprises, except 
for three, are negative in sign. Negative surprises could be considered as bad news for equity 
markets, as they suggest that the Bank purchased fewer assets than the market expected. The 
only MPC meetings when the unexpected asset purchases were of significant magnitude and 
of positive sign were those on October 6th, 2011 and August 4th, 2016 when the Bank 
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announced £56.25 and £29.09 billion asset purchases more than what was expected 
respectively.  
We capture equities’ reaction using two intraday windows. Both windows begin 10 
minutes before the announcement, i.e., at 11:50am. The narrower window finishes 1 hour after 
the MPC announcement at 1pm, whereas the wider window ranges to the closing of the trading 
day. Recent papers have examined the effects of unconventional monetary policy by measuring 
equities’ responses to the unexpected element of announcements only over a short intraday 
window surrounding the announcement (e.g., Rogers et al., 2014; Joyce and Tong, 2012).  
We measure the response of equities to news about the Bank’s asset purchases using 
the following empirical specification:  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                                                                                                              (1) 
where 𝑟𝑡 stands for the (log) returns on the FTSE-100 index, calculated over the two alternative 
event windows described above. Specifically, equity returns for the narrow window are 
𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,+60𝑚] = ln 𝑃𝑡,13:00 − ln 𝑃𝑡,11:50 and for the wider window are 𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒] = ln 𝑃𝑡,𝑐 −
ln 𝑃𝑡,11:50, where 𝑃𝑡,ℎℎ: 𝑚𝑚 denotes the equity price on trading day t at the time specified at the 
subscript, or at the close of day 𝑃𝑡,𝑐 . St represents the unexpected element of the MPC’s QE 
announcement on the 95 announcement days, t. The coefficient estimate 𝛽𝑀𝑃 captures the 
equity market’s reaction to unexpected asset purchases by the Bank.  
- Table 1 here - 
We begin our estimations from September 2009, when the Bloomberg survey data 
become available, and we consider the period until December 2017. We report the M-
estimators from the robust regression of Eq. (1) in Table 1, showing that the magnitude of 
equities’ reaction to news of the Bank’s asset purchases depends on the length of the event 
window. Specifically, we find that when the event window spans up to the end of the day, the 
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reaction estimate is positive and statistically significant, whereas during the first hour after the 
announcement, news regarding asset purchases does not influence equity prices. Although the 
reaction estimate is of small magnitude, it is positive suggesting that negative surprises – asset 
purchases that are less than expected – lead to lower equity prices. In particular, if the Bank’s 
actual asset purchases are smaller by £1 billion from what Bloomberg-participating economists 
expected, equities drop by 0.023%.  
The difference in equities’ reaction to QE news between the narrow and the event 
window may signify the difficulties investors face incorporating in a timely fashion the news 
from MPC meetings. A more involved assessment of the effects of MPC announcements over 
these two event windows, however, would require capturing meeting-specific effects that may 
be driving the reaction or the lack of it. For instance, the lack of significant reactions, 
particularly during the first hour of the announcement, may result from systematically opposite 
responses to QE news originating from different MPC announcements. In the following 
section, we consider in more detail the possibility of nonlinearities in the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on equity prices.  
 
B.  The MPC’s Communication Framework and Its Implications  
This section, formally examines the role of the MPC’s communication framework in 
the way news of the Bank’s asset purchases impacts the UK equity market. To that end, we 
employ an empirical specification developed by Chortareas and Noikokyris (2014). We 
partition the MPC meetings in three categories based on their proximity to the inflation report 
release, and we consider equities’ response to news regarding asset purchases on the first, 
second, and third MPC meetings following the release of the inflation report. We now only 
consider the period from September 2009 to August 2015, because since August 2015, the 
Bank has been releasing the minutes of the MPC meetings simultaneously with the meetings’ 
  
11 
policy announcement and the inflation report (when applicable). We construct 0-1 dummy 
variables taking the value of 1 on the 24 (24/23) first (second/third) MPC meetings following 
the release of an inflation report, which we denote as 𝐼1 (𝐼2/𝐼3). The third MPC meeting 
following the inflation report release actually occurs less than a week before the release of the 
next inflation report.  
Furthermore, we investigate the marginal reaction of equities to the Bank’s unexpected 
asset purchases on announcement days directly following the release of the MPC meetings’ 
minutes revealing a unanimous vote of the MPC members in the previous MPC meeting. Until 
July 2015, the minutes of the MPC meetings – and MPC members’ voting decisions – were not 
released with the announcement, but instead were released approximately two weeks later. 
Therefore, this release occurred approximately two weeks before the next MPC meeting, and 
we set IUNA to be a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on the 43 MPC meeting days 
immediately following news of unanimity in the previous MPC meeting decision.3 Finally, IAP 
is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the 4 MPC meetings when the Bank expanded 
the size of its asset purchases program during that period.4 We measure the additional impact 
on these 4 announcement days to account for the possibility of a differential reaction on days 
when actual changes in the size of the Bank’s QE program are announced.  
Thus, we estimate the following regression:  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝛪
1𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛪
2𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛪
3𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑎𝛪
𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑃𝛪
𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                          (2)   
and we report the results for stock returns calculated over both the narrow and the wider 
window in Table 1. We begin by considering the results from the narrow window during the 
first hour after the announcement. Our results point to meeting-specific effects of unexpected 
                                                           
3 From the 43 MPC announcements 13(15/15) correspond to I1(I2/I3) announcements. 
4 From the 4 MPC announcements 0(2/2) correspond to I1(I2/I3) announcements. 
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asset purchases on equity prices. During the first hour, the timing of the inflation report and the 
timing of the news about MPC members’ voting appear to be the determinative factors in the 
relationship between equities and QE surprises.  
 In particular, we find that on MPC meetings occurring in the week before the release of 
the inflation report, smaller-than-expected asset purchases lead to higher equity prices (that is, 
the reaction estimate to the interactive term 𝐼3𝑆𝑡 is negative and statistically significant). This 
result is at odds with what should intuitively be expected. The proximity of the MPC 
announcement to the inflation report release, however, might explain this result. To the extent 
that the Bank’s MPC announcements reveal MPC members’ private views on future economic 
conditions, smaller-than-expected asset purchases less than a week before the inflation report 
might be perceived as revealing private information about better-than-expected news from the 
forthcoming inflation report release. This result would seem to suggest that these MPC 
announcements take on the role of a predictor of the inflation report.  
Conversely, on MPC meeting days following news of a unanimous decision in the 
previous committee meeting, we document a pronounced response of stock prices to news 
regarding asset purchases (the estimated coefficient 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑎 is positive and statistically 
significant). The sign of the reaction estimate is in line with theoretical predictions and 
consistent with that observed during the conventional monetary policy period from 1994 to 
2008 (Chortareas and Noikokyris, 2014). Considering the individualistic nature of the MPC’s 
decision-making process (Blinder and Wyplosz, 2004; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), the 
dissenting votes and the discussions explaining them constitute an integral part of investors’ 
information set. Thus, the absence of opposing views limits the information available to 
investors regarding future monetary policy. Hence, in the MPC meeting just two weeks later, 
any news about asset purchases weighs heavily in the equities price discovery process during 
the first hour following the announcement.  
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When we consider the wider event window, we find that UK equities respond only to 
news about the Bank’s asset purchases originating from the second MPC meeting following 
the release of an inflation report. In particular, we find that the reaction estimate to the 
interactive term 𝐼2𝑆𝑡 in Eq. (2) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that equity 
prices drop following news about smaller-than-expected asset purchases.5 Therefore, equities 
respond in a manner intuitively expected only with regard to MPC announcement news that is 
unaccompanied by fresh inflation report news or when no inflation report is due in the 
following week. The absence of any significant response on any other MPC meeting day (both 
𝛽1 and 𝛽3 coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant) indicates the dominance of the 
inflation report over the news content of MPC meetings immediately following or preceding 
these releases. There is also some evidence of more pronounced equities’ response to MPC 
meeting news following the release of minutes indicating a unanimous decision in the previous 
committee meeting which, however, is only marginally significant at the 10% level. 
The way in which the Bank’s communication intertwines with the MPC meeting 
schedule, therefore, appears to influence the manner in which news regarding asset purchases 
influence equities in both event windows. This influence, however, is not homogeneous for 
both event windows. During the first hour, equities respond only to QE news from MPC 
meetings occurring in the week before the inflation report and following news of unanimity in 
the previous decision. In fact, equities reaction to QE news from these MPC meetings is to the 
opposite direction and, hence, our results from Eq. (1), which does not account for meeting-
specific effects, do not show a statistically significant relationship. Allowing more time for 
processing the economic news from MPC announcements renders the pattern observed during 
                                                           
5 The only announcement with positive surprises occurs on the second MPC meeting following the release of the 
inflation report, and it also coincides with one of the four meetings in which a change in the size of the asset 
purchase program was announced. Thus, the marginal reaction estimate to the interactive term 𝐼𝐴𝑃 × 𝑆𝑡 captures 
the reaction of equities to positive surprises. 
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the first hour an overreaction, as this reaction dissipates when equity returns are measured over 
the wider window. Instead, for the wider window we only find statistically significant results, 
with a sign expected by theory, on MPC meetings occurring further in time from inflation 
report releases. This impact does not occur during the first hour from an MPC announcement 
possibly reflecting investors’ difficulty in incorporating in a timely fashion the news emanating 
from the announcements. 
 
C. Pre-Announcement Drift  
In Fig. 2, we show that, although statistically insignificant, equities display an upward 
drift in the hours before announcement. To formally examine whether there is a pre-
announcement drift in the UK stock market, we investigate whether stock returns are 
systematically larger during the hours leading up to the MPC announcements using the 
following empirical specification developed by Lucca and Moench (2015). Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation:  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐼𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑀𝑃𝐶 + 𝜀𝑡 .                                                                                                      (3) 
In this equation, 𝑟𝑡 represents the returns on the FTSE-100 index calculated over the 
period from the beginning of the trading day t at 8:00am until 11:55am of the same day 
(𝑟𝑡,[08:00,11:55] = ln 𝑃𝑡,11:55 − ln 𝑃𝑡,08:00). 𝐼
𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑀𝑃𝐶 is the pre-announcement dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if an MPC decision announcement is released at 12 noon of day t, and zero 
otherwise. We examine the robustness of our results also by considering stock returns from 12 
noon on day t-1 to 11:55am on day t (𝑟𝑡,[12:00,11:55] = ln 𝑃𝑡,11:55 − ln 𝑃𝑡−1,12:00).  
We report the results from the estimation of Eq. (3) in Table 2, and we find no 
significant pre-announcement effects in the UK stock market. Specifically, we find that the 
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coefficient estimates β from Eq. (3) for both pre-announcement windows are statistically 
insignificant (columns (1) and (2) in Table 2), and that they remain so even after we trim the 
top and bottom 1% stock returns from our sample (columns (3) and (4) in Table 2). We only 
report a pre-announcement drift for the shorter pre-announcement window, which, however, is 
marginally significant at the 10% level. Lucca and Moench (2015) reach a similar result when 
they investigate the presence of a pre-MPC decision announcement drift in UK stock returns 
for the period up to 2011.6  
- Table 2 here - 
Next, we evaluate the extent to which the pre-announcement drift is associated with 
news about the Bank’s asset purchases. To that end, we regress pre-MPC equity returns on 
news regarding asset purchases on the 95 MPC meeting days. We report the results from this 
estimation in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, and we find lower pre-MPC returns when smaller-
than-expected asset purchases are announced at the MPC meeting. This result holds only for 
pre-MPC returns calculated over the wider window from 12 noon on day t-1 to 11:55am on 
day t. When we use equity returns from the shorter pre-announcement window including data 
only from the MPC meeting day, we also report a positive reaction estimate, but it is less 
pronounced and statistically significant only at the 10% level.  
This result is surprising, according to Lucca and Moench (2015), because it shows ex-
ante equity returns being sensitive to QE news that is known only ex-post to investors. 
Moreover, it might partly account for the weak response (in absolute terms) of equities to QE 
news, as it suggests that part of the impact of QE news is not captured by the event window 
employed in our empirical setup. A more involved examination of the determinants of pre-
                                                           
6 Lucca and Moench (2015) indicate that they do not find significant pre-announcement effects of the Bank’s 
announcements, although they do not report this result in their paper.  
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MPC returns would seek to identify the impact of other relevant news arriving during the pre-
MPC announcement period. In this manner, we would be in position to assess whether the 
positive association between QE news and pre-MPC equity returns is due to news leaks or other 
reasons, but such an assessment would extend beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
III. MPC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY 
 
A. Daily Implied and Realized Volatility Response to Bank Announcements. 
We use the event-study framework from the previous section, and we estimate the UK 
equity returns’ volatility response – both historical and implied – to news about Bank’s asset 
purchases. We use the FTSE-100 implied volatility index as a measure of implied volatility 
(IV). This index measures the interpolated 30-day expected volatility and is calculated using 
the prices of out-of-the-money traded options. We obtain data for the realized volatility of the 
FTSE-100 index (RV) from the Oxford-Man Institute’s “realized library” (Gerd et al., 2009). 
This measure for realized variance is daily in frequency and is produced using high frequency 
data from that day only. Thus, we estimate: 
         𝛥𝑉𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐼
1𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼
2𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼
3𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑎𝐼
𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑃𝐼
𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                      (4) 
where ΔVt represents the first difference of either implied (ΔIVt) or realized volatility (ΔRVt).  
- Table 3 here - 
In column (1) of Table 3, we report the M-estimators for Eq. (4) when the dependent 
variable represents changes in implied volatility. We find that news regarding asset purchases 
from MPC announcements does not influence the level of expected volatility in the UK stock 
market (all five reaction estimates to the interactive terms are insignificant). This result differs 
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from the findings of Gospodinov and Jamali (2012), who find that tightening monetary policy 
shocks lead to positive changes in implied volatility in the US over the 1994-2007 period.  
We find ,however, that the occurrence of the announcement itself leads to lower levels 
of expected volatility over the next 30 days (the intercept is negative and statistically 
significant). Gospodinov and Jamali (2012) reach a similar result, which suggests that the mere 
occurrence of an MPC announcement leads to more synchronized expectations about future 
monetary policy. Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012) also find that certain macroeconomic 
announcements enhance the precision of expectations lowering the level of UK interest rates’ 
conditional volatility, after controlling for the actual news contained in these announcements.  
We also estimate Eq. (4) for realized volatility, and in contrast to the results for implied 
volatility, we find a statistically significant positive intercept, which indicates significant 
positive changes in realized volatility on MPC meeting days (column (2) of Table 3). To test 
the differences in the response of implied and realized volatility to news regarding asset 
purchases, we employ a system of seemingly unrelated regressions similar to that developed 
by Gospodinov and Jamali (2012). The difference between the intercept estimates from these 
two regressions is statistically significant, as we show in column (3) of Table 3. The positive 
and statistically significant intercept in the realized volatility equation is consistent with Chuliá 
et al. (2010), who find that the occurrence of adverse news from FOMC announcements not 
only leads to positive changes in intraday realized volatility but also is more important than the 
news itself. This finding also holds for the Bank’s announcements during the QE period under 
examination.  
Moreover, we find that news of smaller-than-expected asset purchases on the second 
MPC meeting days following an inflation report release helps investors coordinate their beliefs, 
as it leads to lower levels of realized volatility (the coefficient estimate 𝛽2 is positive and 
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statistically significant). This result holds unless an increase in the size of the Bank’s asset 
purchase program is announced on that particular MPC decision day. In this case, the negative 
and statistically significant marginal reaction estimate 𝛽𝐴𝑃 completely offsets the positive 
reaction estimate 𝛽2.  
We also use two alternative proxies for realized volatility to assess the robustness of 
this result. The first is the forward-looking measure for the (annualized) realized variance of 
Gospodinov et al. (2006), which is also used in Gospodinov and Jamali (2012). Based on this 
specification, the stock market’s realized volatility on day t (RVG) is constructed as follows 
using the 22-day-ahead squared stock returns: 
𝑅𝑉𝑡
𝐺 = √
1
22
∑ 𝑟𝑖
2
22
𝑖=𝑡+1
× √252,                                                                                                (5) 
where 𝑟𝑖 = ln 𝑃𝑡,𝑐 − ln 𝑃𝑡−1,𝑐. The second measure for realized volatility is that constructed in 
the spirit of Chuliá et al. (2010) as follows: 
𝑅𝑉𝑡
𝐶 = √∑(𝑟𝑡,𝑘)
2
𝑢
𝑘
× √252.                                                                                                  (6) 
𝑟𝑡,𝑘 = ln 𝑃𝑡,𝑘 − ln 𝑃𝑡,𝑘−5𝑚 now stands for the 5-minute returns on the FTSE-100 index on day 
t.7 𝑢 corresponds to the number of all 5-minute intervals on trading day t. The first 5-minute 
interval following the MPC announcement is excluded from the calculation of the realized 
volatility on MPC announcement days.  
                                                           
7 k-(k-5m) is the 5-minute interval, i.e., if k = 15:35 then k-5m = 15:30.  
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We report the results from the estimation of Eq. (4) for both dependent variables ΔRVG 
and ΔRVC in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, respectively. Our results suggest that the realized 
volatility, when calculated from Eq. (5) using 22-day-ahead daily returns, does not respond to 
QE surprises, as all the reaction estimates are statistically insignificant. However, when the 
realized volatility of stock returns on MPC announcement days is calculated from Eq. (6), using 
intraday data from that day only, our results are similar to those obtained when the data for 
realized volatility of Gerd et al. (2009) are used. The absence of a significant response when 
the volatility measure is constructed by excluding data from the MPC announcement day 
suggests that the impact of the MPC announcement is short-lived and traced only on the 
announcement day.  
Therefore, QE news from the second MPC announcement following the inflation report 
releases takes on the dual role that is ascribed to public information by Morris and Shin (2002). 
First, these announcements contain fundamental information. As we have shown in the 
previous section, equity prices respond to news emanating from them in a theoretically sound 
manner. Second, these announcements constitute a focal point helping investors coordinate 
their beliefs, as news about smaller-than-expected asset purchases results in lower realized 
volatility. A possible reason why news from these announcements carries significant weight 
for investors might be that they occur further away in time from inflation report releases than 
the other MPC announcements. This announcement follows the previous inflation report 
release by almost two months, whereas the next is more than a month ahead.  
 
B. Intraday Volatility and the Bank’s Announcements. 
Finally, in this section, we measure the impact of the Bank’s MPC announcements on 
intraday measures of the UK equity returns volatility using the regression from Eq. (4). We use 
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two measures of intraday volatility to gauge the impact of MPC announcements on UK equity 
returns’ volatility in the hour bracketing the announcement. The first measure is obtained from 
Eq. (6) but instead of calculating the daily realized volatility, we now calculate equities’ 
realized volatility for the period beginning 10 minutes before the announcement up to 1 hour 
following the announcement.  
The second measure is the change in volatility ratios (ΔVOLR) for equity returns used 
by Andersson (2010). We define a volatility ratio as the ratio of the volatility of intraday returns 
on MPC decision dates t to the average volatility on all other 236 Thursdays τ, excluding MPC 
announcements, for the same time frame. This specification defines the volatility of equity 
returns as the absolute value of the log price change. That is, on a day i the volatility of equity 
returns from noon to 1pm is given by 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝑖,[0,+1ℎ]] = 𝑎𝑏𝑠[ln(𝑃𝑖,13:00) − (𝑃𝑖,12:00)], while for 
the period from 11:30 to noon it is 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝑖,[−30𝑚,0]] = 𝑎𝑏𝑠[ln(𝑃𝑖,12:00) − (𝑃𝑖,11:30)]. So, if  𝑡 =
1, 2, … ,71 corresponds to the days of monetary policy decisions, and 𝜏 = 1,2, … ,236 stands 
for the same weekdays but when no MPC announcement has taken place, then the change in 
volatility ratio is given as follows: 
𝛥𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡,[−30𝑚,+1ℎ] =
𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝑡,[0,+1ℎ]]
1
𝜏 ∑ 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝜏,[0,+1ℎ]]
236
𝜏=1
−
𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝑡,[−30𝑚,0]]
1
𝜏 ∑ 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑟𝜏,[−30𝑚,0]]
236
𝜏=1
.                 (7) 
We now regress these two intraday measures of the volatility of UK equity returns on 
the same independent variables as in Eq. (4), except that we now use the absolute value of the 
surprise (𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡]). Results from the M estimation of these regressions are reported in Table 4. 
Again, we find statistically significant results only for those MPC meetings directly preceding 
the publication of an inflation report and following news of unanimity in the previous MPC 
decision. Our results show that news about asset purchases increases equity returns’ volatility 
for the MPC meetings preceding the inflation report release by a week (the reaction estimate 
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to the interactive term 𝐼3 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] is positive and statistically significant). Considering that 
these MPC meetings might be perceived as bearing news about the forthcoming inflation 
report, this speculation appears to increase volatility, as investors adjust their portfolios to 
reflect the expected news.  
-Table 4 here- 
In addition, we report a negative marginal reaction of equities to QE news from the 
MPC announcements that follows the publication of minutes revealing unanimity in the 
previous MPC decision (the reaction estimate to the interactive term 𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑎 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] is negative 
and statistically significant). This result shows that QE news from these MPC meeting days 
leads to lower volatility. This news possibly enhances the coordination of expectations in the 
stock market, as investors replace private views on future monetary policy with the public 
information from the MPC meeting (Morris and Shin, 2002). The relatively reduced 
information set of investors arising from the absence of dissenting votes makes them 
underweight private information and place more emphasis on the public information from the 
MPC meeting.   
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper considers the effects of the UK’s QE program on equity prices and on their 
volatility. We use an event-study framework and intraday data to characterize UK equity 
prices’ reactions to the Bank’s QE announcements. The key contributions of the paper include 
identifying the relatively unexplored effects of unconventional monetary policy on stock price 
volatility, and the association of the magnitude of the pass-through of QE news into UK 
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equities with the MPC communication framework. To capture the latter effect, we focus on 
two key aspects of the MPC’s communication framework, i.e., the publication of inflation 
reports and the voting records of the MPC members. 
Our results point to a statistically significant relationship between QE surprises and 
equity returns on the days of MPC meeting announcements, which is nonetheless of small 
magnitude. Although our evidence reiterates prior findings regarding the statistically 
significant impact of QE announcements on intraday UK equity prices (e.g., Rogers et al., 
2014), we also estimate the time dimension of this impact. Particularly, we find that news from 
MPC announcements affects equity returns only when the latter are measured over a period 
starting 10 minutes before the announcement and finishing at the end of the trading day. 
Moreover, we find a significant relationship between QE surprises and pre-announcement 
returns, which might partly account for the less pronounced impact of QE announcements on 
equities.  
Additionally, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of the Bank’s 
communication policy in the magnitude of the impact of QE announcements on equity returns 
and their volatility. Specifically, we explore the extent to which equity markets’ reactions to 
QE news from MPC meetings depend on the meeting’s proximity to an inflation report release 
and to information about unanimity in the previous MPC meeting. In Table 5 we provide a 
summary of the results from our estimations for both the narrow and the wider windows for 
comparison reasons.  
-Table 5 here- 
During the first hour following the MPC meeting announcements, equities react 
significantly and in a manner intuitively expected only in connection with those MPC meeting 
announcements following news about a unanimous decision in the previous MPC meeting. QE 
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news from these MPC meeting announcements also appears to reduce stock price volatility. 
When we consider the impact of QE news from MPC meeting announcements preceding the 
inflation report release by a week, however, the results reveal a different pattern. This QE news 
appears to increase volatility in the equity markets during the hour following the 
announcement, and the reaction by the equity market is perplexing. Smaller-than-expected 
asset purchases are now perceived as positive news, leading to slightly higher equity prices, as 
perhaps they are perceived to be predictors of the news included in the forthcoming inflation 
report.  
Although equities are sensitive to news from MPC meetings attracting media attention 
(e.g., unanimous decisions and imminent inflation report releases) during the first hour 
following an announcement, when we consider a wider window a different picture emerges 
(see panel B in Table 5). Equity returns and their volatility appear to respond significantly, both 
in magnitude and statistically, only to QE surprises emanating from the second MPC meetings 
following release of an inflation report. These MPC meetings occur almost two months after 
the previous inflation report release and at least a month from the new inflation report, 
reinforcing the view that the inflation report is the dominant channel of the Bank’s information 
dissemination process.    
The results of this study have policy implications, as they allow a preliminary 
evaluation of the changes in the MPC meeting schedule that were effective beginning in August 
2015. Under the new schedule, the policy decisions of MPC meetings and their minutes are 
released simultaneously. The inflation reports are also released on the same day with the MPC 
policy decision. Moreover, the second MPC meetings following the release of the inflation 
report have been discontinued. In particular, the Bank dropped the 4 meetings taking place 
further in time from the release of an inflation report release, which is when our results indicate 
the highest sensitivity of equities to QE news. Finally, the fact that the MPC meetings, their 
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minutes, and the inflation reports are all published simultaneously reduces the possibility for 
overreactions similar to those that we have identified in this study for the 2009-2015 period.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1 
QE SURPRISES AND UK EQUITY RETURNS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,+60𝑚] 𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒] 𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,+60𝑚] 𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒] 
c .001 
(-0.02) 
.027 
(0.45) 
.007 
(0.33) 
-.001 
(-0.01) 
𝑆𝑡 -.004 
(-1.10) 
.023*** 
(2.61) 
- - 
𝐼1 × 𝑆𝑡 - - .032 
(1.59) 
-.007 
(-0.11) 
𝐼2 × 𝑆𝑡 - - .011 
(0.46) 
.183** 
(2.47) 
𝐼3 × 𝑆𝑡 - - -.058** 
(-2.46) 
-.080 
(-1.08) 
𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑎 × 𝑆𝑡 - - .063** 
(2.26) 
.144* 
(1.65) 
𝐼𝐴𝑃 × 𝑆𝑡  - - -.015 
(-0.62) 
-.152** 
(-2.06) 
R2(%) 1.24 3.68 10.04 13.97 
Obs. 95 95 71 71 
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), we report results from the estimation of Eq. 
(1). Two different event windows for the calculation of stock returns are 
employed: both start 10 minutes before the MPC announcement and the 
narrow one ends 1 hour after the announcement (𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,+60𝑚]), while the 
wider one extends up to the closing of the trading day (𝑟𝑡,[−10𝑚,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒]). St 
denotes the unexpected element of the MPC’s QE announcement, which is 
calculated as the difference between the actual asset purchases by the Bank 
and the mean of Bloomberg economists’ forecasts about the Bank’s asset 
purchases: 𝑆𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡. In columns (1) and (2), we examine 95 MPC 
announcements starting from September 2009 until December 2017, while 
in columns (3) and (4) our sample includes 71 MPC announcements until 
July 2015. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results from Eq. (2), where 
I1, I2 and I3 are 0-1 dummy variables taking the value of 1 on the 24 MPC 
meetings immediately following the release of an inflation report (I1), the 
24 second MPC meeting days following the release of an inflation report 
(I2), and the 23 MPC meetings immediately preceding the release of an 
inflation report (I3). IUNA is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on 
the 43 MPC meeting days directly following releases of MPC meetings’ 
minutes indicating unanimity in the decision of the previous MPC meeting. 
IAP is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on the 4 MPC meetings 
when there is an increase in the size of the program. The Obs. row shows 
the number of observations in each equation. 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels 
respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
PRE-MPC Announcement Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑟𝑡,[08:00,11:55] 𝑟𝑡,[12:00,11:55] 𝑟𝑡,[08:00,11:55] 
(excl. top/bottom 1%) 
𝑟𝑡,[12:00,11:55] 
(excl. top/bottom 1%) 
𝑟𝑡,[08:00,11:55] 𝑟𝑡,[12:00,11:55] 
c -.028** 
(-2.44) 
.012 
(0.55) 
-.024** 
(-2.30) 
.021 
(1.12) 
0.07 
(1.37) 
.123 
(1.26) 
𝐼𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑀𝑃𝐶 .117* 
(1.79) 
.104 
(0.99) 
.061 
(1.28) 
.031 
(0.32) 
- - 
𝑆𝑡 - - - - .014* 
(1.86) 
.036** 
(2.48) 
Obs. 2,097 2,097 2,057 2,057 95 95 
MPC Ann. 95 95 90 93 95 95 
Notes: In columns (1) - (4) of this Table we report the results from Eq. (3). 𝐼𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑀𝑃𝐶 is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 on the 95 pre-announcement windows which are directly followed by MPC announcements and zero 
otherwise. In columns (5) – (6) we show the results from Eq. (1), but now we use pre-MPC announcement equity 
returns. St is the unexpected element of the MPC’s quantitative easing announcement. The Obs. row shows the 
number of observations in each equation, and the MPC Ann. row shows the number of MPC announcements. 
Huber-White standard errors for the estimates are reported in the parentheses.  
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
QE SURPRISES AND DAILY CHANGES IN EQUITY VOLATILITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
 ΔIV ΔRV βIV=βRV 
[Sign.] 
ΔRVG ΔRVC 
c -.660*** 
(-3.41) 
1.11*** 
(3.04) 
[0.00] -.093 
(-1.22) 
.854** 
(2.17) 
𝐼1 × 𝑆𝑡 .130 
(0.79) 
.100 
(0.32) 
[0.98] .009 
(0.14) 
.048 
(0.14) 
𝐼2 × 𝑆𝑡 -.149 
(-0.73) 
.776** 
(2.02) 
[0.02] -.045 
(-0.56) 
.757** 
(1.98) 
𝐼3 × 𝑆𝑡 .028 
(0.13) 
.444 
(1.15) 
[0.35] .006 
(0.08) 
.450 
(1.08) 
𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑎 × 𝑆𝑡 -.169 
(-0.70) 
-.233 
(-0.51) 
[0.95] -.008 
(-0.08) 
-.325 
(-0.66) 
𝐼𝐴𝑃 × 𝑆𝑡  .093 
(0.46) 
-.732** 
(-1.99) 
[0.03] -.013 
(-0.17) 
-.738* 
(-1.91) 
R2(%) 7.53 7.69 - 8.29 6.28 
Obs. 71 71 - 71 71 
Notes: This table displays the results from the M-estimation of Eq. (4). ΔIV is the daily 
change in implied volatility taken by the FTSE-100 implied volatility index. ΔRV 
denotes the daily change in realized volatility taken from the Oxford-Man Institute’s 
“realized library” (Gerd et al., 2009). Column (3) reports the p-value of an equality 
test of the estimates from regressions in columns (1) and (2). ΔRVG and ΔRVC stand 
for the daily change of the stock market’s realized volatility obtained from Eq. (5) and 
Eq. (6) from the main body of the text respectively. The Obs. row shows the number 
of observations in each equation. 
  
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
QE SURPRISES AND INTRADAY VOLATILITY 
 (1) (2) 
 ΔRVC ΔVOLR 
c 2.86*** 
(17.81) 
-.159 
(-1.55) 
𝐼1 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] .100 
(0.73) 
.076 
(0.88) 
𝐼2 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] .063 
(0.37) 
.154 
(1.43) 
𝐼3 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] .408** 
(2.40) 
.346*** 
(3.19) 
𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑎 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] -.453** 
(-2.26) 
-.250** 
(-1.96) 
𝐼𝐴𝑃 × 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡] .105 
(0.62) 
-.084 
(-0.78) 
R2(%) 11.59 15.24 
Obs. 71 71 
Notes: This table reports the results from the M-estimation of Eq. 
(4). ΔRVC is the realized volatility of equities from 10-minutes 
before the announcement until 1 hour after the announcement 
calculated from Eq. (6). ΔVOLR is the volatility ratio, calculated 
by Eq. (7), showing the difference between the volatility ratio for 
FTSE-100 index returns for the hour following the MPC 
announcement and the volatility ratio for the 30 minutes before 
it. 𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑆𝑡 ] is the absolute value of the unexpected element of 
MPC announcements. The Obs. row shows the number of 
observations in each equation.  
 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence 
levels respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY OF EQUITIES’ REACTION 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 Narrow window 
[-10m, +60m] 
 Wide window 
[-10m, close] 
 Returns 
Realized 
Volatility 
 
Returns 
Realized 
Volatility 
𝐼1 none none  none none 
𝐼2 none none  positive positive 
𝐼3 negative positive  none none 
𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑎 positive negative  none none 
𝐼𝐴𝑃 none none  negative negative 
Notes: In the column Returns in Panels A and B of this table, 
we report the sign (‘positive’/‘negative’) of the reaction 
estimates from Eq. (2) when equity returns are measured both 
over the narrow and the wider event windows described in the 
main body of the text, respectively. In the column Realized 
Volatility of Panel A, we report the sign of the reactions of 
the two measures of intraday volatility, obtained from Eq. (6) 
and Eq. (7) as described in the main body of the text, to QE 
news from MPC announcements presented in Table 4. In the 
column Realized Volatility of Panel B, we report the sign of 
the reaction estimates from Eq. (4) where daily realized 
volatility is measured using intraday data from the MPC 
announcement day (measures are obtained either by Oxford-
Man Institute’s realized library or from Eq. (6). ‘none’ 
suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship.  
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FIGURE 1 
 TIMELINE OF MPC INFORMATION DISSEMINATION ACTIONS. 
 
Notes: This figure plots the publication schedule of Bank’s information dissemination activities (MPC meetings, their 
supporting minutes, and inflation reports) over a three-month period from November 2009 to February 2010. 
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FIGURE 2 
CUMULATIVE STOCK RETURNS ON FTSE 100 STOCK PRICE INDEX. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed line indicates the time of the MPC announcement. The solid 
line depicts the average cumulative 5-minute returns on the 95 Thursdays of MPC 
announcement days from September 2009 to December 2017. The dashed line depicts 
the average cumulative 5-minute returns on all other 338 Thursdays in our sample, 
excluding the ones that have an MPC announcement. 90% confidence intervals from 
Newey-West standard errors are constructed for each point-wise mean of cumulative 
returns, and only points marked with ♦ are statistically different from zero. 
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FIGURE 3 
UNEXPECTED ASSET PURCHASES ON BANK’S ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
A. Actual vs. forecast size of APP 
 
B. Monetary Policy Surprises (S) 
 
Notes: The dashed line in Panel A of this figure reports the actual size of the Bank’s asset 
purchase program (APP) as announced at each of the 95 MPC meetings (actual), while the 
solid line depicts the average of the forecasts provided by economists taking part in 
Bloomberg’s survey preceding the MPC meeting (expected). Monetary surprises (S) in Panel 
B show the difference between the actual minus the expected size of the Bank’s asset purchase 
program.   
 
 
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
S
ep
-0
9
F
eb
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
D
ec
-1
0
M
ay
-1
1
O
ct
-1
1
M
ar
-1
2
A
u
g
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
Ju
n
-1
3
N
o
v
-1
3
A
p
r-
1
4
S
ep
-1
4
F
eb
-1
5
Ju
l-
1
5
D
ec
-1
5
M
ay
-1
6
O
ct
-1
6
M
ar
-1
7
A
u
g
-1
7
actual
expected
56.25
-10
10
45
60
S
ep
-0
9
D
ec
-0
9
M
ar
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
S
ep
-1
0
D
ec
-1
0
M
ar
-1
1
Ju
n
-1
1
S
ep
-1
1
D
ec
-1
1
M
ar
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
S
ep
-1
2
D
ec
-1
2
M
ar
-1
3
Ju
n
-1
3
S
ep
-1
3
D
ec
-1
3
M
ar
-1
4
Ju
n
-1
4
S
ep
-1
4
D
ec
-1
4
M
ar
-1
5
Ju
n
-1
5
S
ep
-1
5
D
ec
-1
5
M
ar
-1
6
Ju
n
-1
6
S
ep
-1
6
D
ec
-1
6
M
ar
-1
7
Ju
n
-1
7
S
ep
-1
7
D
ec
-1
7
29.09 
